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The Public Trust Doctrine: A Tragedy of the
Common Law
OYSTER WARS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST: PROPERTY, LAW, AND ECOLOGY
IN NEW JERSEY HISTORY. By Bonnie J. McCay.t  Tucson: The
University of Arizona Press, 1998. Pp. xxxi, 246. $45.00.*
Reviewed by James R. Rasband*
I. Introduction
During the last thirty years, few issues in natural resources law have
received more scholarly attention than the public trust doctrine, the
doctrine that a state legislature has a trust obligation to the public at large
which prohibits it from permanently privatizing certain natural resources.'
The reasons for this interest are not particularly mysterious. For reform-
minded scholars disenchanted with the historical eagerness of state legisla-
tures to exploit and consume natural resources, the public trust doctrine
symbolizes something of a legal holy grail: an extra-constitutional, counter-
majoritarian check on the natural resource allocation decisions of misguided
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Steven Loertscher, and Scott Brown for their able research assistance.
1. This definition of the public trust doctrine is dramatically simplified. A slightly more detailed
but still truncated account of the doctrine is that it describes the state's fiduciary responsibilities with
respect to land under navigable water and, more recently, other associated natural resources. See
generally 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 30.02(a), at 39-40 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1996) (providing
a historical overview of the public trust doctrine); James R. Rasband, Equitable Compensation for
Public Trust Takings, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 331,379 (1998) (describing how the category of resources
to be held in trust by the state has expanded to include water appropriated from navigable watercourses,
as well as recreational and ecological values associated with navigable waters). The state's fiduciary
responsibility manifests itself in two interpretive approaches to limitations on the privatization of so-
called "trust resources." Some courts have suggested that the trust obligation altogether prohibits a
state from granting away trust resources; other courts have said that the state may make such grants
but that they are necessarily subject to revocation. See id. at 358-60 (discussing this distinction between
grants that are void ab initio and those that are merely voidable). Certain grants of trust resources are
neither void nor voidable. See infra text accompanying note 39.
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legislative majorities.' On another side of the debate-the side on which
I find myself-the public trust doctrine is viewed as more akin to the
Sirens' song of Greek mythology: the promise of reversing previous
resource misallocations is alluring but the price of that satisfaction is too
steep. Application of the doctrine can result not only in a dangerous
usurpation of legislative authority3 but also in a potential violation of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments when a prior grant of trust resources is
revoked or modified without payment of just compensation.4
Unsurprisingly, the competing perceptions of the promise or peril of
the public trust doctrine have spawned a wide variety of law review
articles.5 Dr. Bonnie McCay's Oyster Wars and the Public Trust
addresses an area neglected in the legal literature: the key role that
nineteenth-century New Jersey oyster disputes played in the development
of the public trust doctrine. To those unfamiliar with the origins of the
doctrine, this focus may seem odd. Why New Jersey? Why oysters? In
fact, the focus is quite logical and creates some of the book's value. It is
logical because the two seminal decisions that ultimately gave birth to the
2. The two most prominent cases in public trust jurisprudence illustrate the potential value of the
public trust doctrine to natural resource protection. In Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387, 463-64 (1892), the United States Supreme Court held that the public trust doctrine allowed the
Illinois legislature to revoke without payment of compensation a prior grant to the Illinois Central
Railroad of approximately 1000 acres of submerged lands in Chicago harbor. Similarly, in National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709,723, 732 (Cal. 1983), the California Supreme Court
ruled that California could, without paying any compensation, reduce Los Angeles's previously granted
water right to withdraw water from Mono Lake.
3. It is worth noting that the judiciary does not always act in a countermajoritarian fashion when
it applies the public trust doctrine. In some instances, as was the case in Illinois Central R.R., a court
is only validating a subsequent legislative revocation of a prior legislative grant. The counter-
majoritarian concern arises when the court revokes or limits a prior grant of trust resources without
reference to a legislative determination, as was the case in NationalAudobon Society. See supra note
2 (briefly setting forth the facts of both Illinois Central Railroad and National Audobon Society).
4. The Fifth Amendment's just compensation requirement has been applied to the states via the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; Chicago,
Burlington, & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (incorporating the just com-
pensation requirement into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and applying it to
takings by states).
5. See, e.g., Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law: Discord
or Harmony?, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17-1 (1985); George A. Gould, The Public Trust
Doctrine and Water Rights, 34 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 25-1 (1988); James L. Huffman, Trusting
the Public Interest to Judges: A Comment on the Public Trust Writings of Professors Sax, Wilkinson,
Dunning and Johnson, 63 DENy. U. L. REv. 565 (1986); see also Richard J. Lazarus, Changing
Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine,
71 IOwA L. REv. 631 (1986); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); Symposium on the Public Trust and the
Waters of the American West: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 19 ENVTL. L. 425 (1989); The Public
Trust Doctrine in NaturalResources Law and Management: A Symposium, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 181
(1980).
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modem public trust doctrine-Arnold v. Mundy6 and Martin v. Wddell's
Lessee7 -both grew out of nineteenth-century New Jersey oyster disputes.
The focus on the oyster industry adds value because public access to the
oyster resource presents an ideal case study for application of public trust
principles.
The core proposition of the public trust doctrine is that the state must
hold land under navigable water (originally defined as those waters which
ebbed and flowed with the tide) in trust for the people, so that the people
may use those lands for purposes of navigation, commerce, and fishery.9
Oysters, which are physically tied to land under navigable water, I" and
are part of the ocean fishery, are thus the prototypical public trust
resource. Yet because oysters are attached to land, just like timber and
minerals, they are also ideal candidates for privatization. Thus, from its
beginnings, the oyster industry was a flash point for public trust disputes.
What early oyster disputes reveal about the origins and evolution of the
public trust doctrine will be the focus of this review.
The review discusses two contributions that Oyster Wrs makes to the
public trust literature. The first is a function of McCay's approach to
tracing the development of the public trust doctrine. Rather than focusing
solely on the "major court cases for both their content and their
contributions to an evolving common law,"" McCay also takes what she
terms a "more anthropological" approach: namely, she explores "the
events, issues, and people behind the cases and decisions and how they
might be connected with one another."' 2 This contextualized exploration
6. 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
7. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
8. At common law in England, the term "navigable waters" had application almost exclusively to
the waters that ebbed and flowed with the tide. See Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 337
(1876) (noting that "the only waters recognized as navigable in England were tide-waters"). In the
United States, by contrast, navigable waters have been expanded to include all bodies of water that are
navigable in fact. See Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 667 (1891); The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 443, 457 (1851) (both holding that admiralty jurisdiction in the United States is not
confined to the ebb and flow of the tide, but extends to all navigable waters).
9. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971). This core understanding of the
public trust doctrine has now been expanded beyond land under navigable water to include other
resources. See supra note 1; infra note 40.
10. See WILLIAM K. BROOKS, THE OYSTER: A POPULAR SUMMARY OF A SCIENTIFIC STUDY 82-85
(2d ed. rev. 1905) (describing how oysters grow attached to tidelands in large conglomerations known
as beds).
11. Pp. xxviii-xxix.
12. P. xxix. McCay, a self-described "ecological anthropologist" who is not law trained, deni-
grates the case analysis as "little more than a law review exercise," p. xxix, and seems to regard her
"anthropological" approach as foreign to legal analysis, which she perceives as "simply identify[ing]
and follow[ing] links between holdings, dicta, and so on, from one court opinion to the next." P. xxix.
The notion that there is a significant difference between a legal approach, which she implies is rather
mechanical and pedestrian, and an anthropological approach, which is contextualized and wide-ranging,
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of the foundational cases of the public trust doctrine is valuable because it
provides new insights into those cases. The second contribution of Oyster
Wirs is simply its focus on the oyster industry. As discussed above, the
laws, customs, and practices of the industry provide an ideal case study
into early legal, political, and social understandings about the state's
authority to privatize a core trust resource.
Although the focus of this review will be on the contributions of
Oyster Wrs to the public trust debate, this is not necessarily McCay's
focus. McCay is clear that her interest in the public trust doctrine is only
incidental to her research on common property regimes. 3 Thus, McCay
uses her anthropological approach not simply to contextualize and broaden
understanding of the development of the public trust doctrine, but also to
provide "access to larger or crosscutting domains of social structure or
culture norms in conflict and consensus." 4 The particular social structure
and cultural norm in which McCay has the most interest is the allocation
of natural resources. Specifically, she uses the oyster industry and the
development of the public trust doctrine to dispute one of the basic axioms
of natural resource policy: Garrett Hardin's famous tragedy of the com-
mons thesis that open access to a natural resource leads inevitably to
overexploitation of the resource. 5
The review briefly addresses McCay's criticism of Hardin. It turns
out that McCay's dispute with Hardin is less about his theory and more
about his language, or what McCay refers to as the "narrative" of the
tragedy of the commons. 16 McCay would like us to think less in terms
of a commons as a necessary "tragedy" and more in terms of a commons
having great social value if managed correctly. Her concern is that the
narrative of commons as tragedy inexorably gives impetus to an anti-
commons solution, namely privatization. And privatization of natural
resources is McCay's real enemy. Thus, McCay suggests that the
instances of overexploitation in the New Jersey oyster fishery were gene-
rally a result of a "mismanaged commons"' 7 that resulted in a "tragedy
of the commoners"" rather than a tragedy of the commons. McCay
seems to believe that altering this vocabulary (or, as she might say,
promoting an alternative narrative) may stem the privatization tide and
is belied by a perusal of almost any law review. That fact, however, does not detract from the value
of McCay's thorough exploration of the context of the early public trust cases.
13. Seep. xxiii.
14. P. xxix.
15. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
16. P. xxiii (describing the tragedy of the commons as "less a formal model than a powerful story
.. about property relations").
17. P. 189.
18. P. 195.
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make natural resource policymakers more inclined to look at alternative
solutions. This Review, however, concludes that it is the theory behind
Hardin's thesis and not his language that ultimately drives natural resource
policy. And McCay's research on the New Jersey oyster industry does
nothing to diminish the theory's validity.
II. The Oyster Industry and the Public Trust Doctrine
A. The Debate Over the Origins of the Public Trust Doctrine
To those engaged in the public trust debate, McCay's contextual
exploration of the development of the public trust doctrine will be of
particular interest with respect to one prominent issue in that debate: the
dispute over the doctrine's origins. Recognizing that judicial review and
invalidation of legislative action generally require a constitutional basis,
some supporters of the public trust doctrine have worked to locate the
public trust doctrine in a constitution, 9 or if not in a constitution, then in
a long-established line of common-law cases. The theory behind this latter
strategy is that any countermajoritarian criticism is at least muted if the
legislature can be said to have impliedly understood-by virtue of that
established precedent-that its grant of a trust resource would be subject to
revocation. Locating the doctrine in long-established precedent also
attempts to respond to the doctrine's critics who have suggested that
exercise of the doctrine to revoke a prior grant of a trust resource may be
a taking.' If the doctrine is long-standing, a private grantee is arguably
on notice of the state's right of revocation. Thus, when the state actually
revokes a prior grant, it is merely exercising an option to which the
19. For an argument that the public trust doctrine is grounded in the federal Constitution, see
Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope
of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 458-59 (1989) (locating authority for the public trust
doctrine in the Commerce Clause). For an argument grounding the doctrine in state constitutions, see
Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law: A Modern View
of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573, 576-77 (1989). For a brief critique of both argu-
ments, see Michael C. Blumm, Harrison C. Dunning, & Scott W. Reed, Renouncing the Public Trust
Doctrine: An Assessment of the Validity ofIdaho House Bill 794, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 461,490-92, 496-
503 (1997); Rasband, supra note 1, at 337-38 & n.26, 365-66; and James R. Rasband, The Disregarded
Common Parentage of the Equal Footing and Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1,
65 n.243, 74 n.271 (1997).
20. Several commentators have argued that an uncompensated revocation of a grant of overflowed
lands or associated resources can constitute a taking. See, e.g., Gould, supra note 5, § 25.05, at 25-
49; James L. Huffman, Avoiding the Takings Clause Through the Myth of Public Rights: The Public
Trust and Reserved Rights Doctrines at Work, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 171 (1987). See generally
Douglas L. Grant, Western Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Some Realism About the
Takings Issue, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423 (1995) (discussing the implications of the Supreme Court's tak-
ings jurisprudence for state and judicial action pursuant to the public trust doctrine).
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grantee's property right was always subject.2' Others of us view the
public trust doctrine as a judicial invention of more recent vintage.' If
this view is correct, the legitimacy of the doctrine's countermajoritarian
content and its uncompensated taking of property rights is undermined.3
The debate over the antiquity of the public trust doctrine has given rise
to competing historical narratives that need some description if McCay's
contributions to the debate are to be evaluated. Advocates of the doctrine
generally trace the public trust doctrine all the way back to Roman law and
The Institutes of Justinian, which provided that "'all of these things are by
natural law common to all: air, flowing water, the sea and, consequently,
the shores of the sea."24 They then track this idea that the shores of the
sea were not capable of private ownership from Roman law into English
common law. They suggest that the crown owned all the foreshore ' in
England but was prohibited from alienating it to private owners because the
crown was obligated to hold it in trust for the people.26 This understand-
ing, they contend, made its way into American law in two nineteenth-
century American cases, both of which involved oyster disputes.
The first of those cases was a New Jersey Supreme Court decision in
1821-Arnold v. Mundy.27  In that case, Arnold contended that Mundy
had trespassed on his oyster bed and stolen oysters which he had planted
there.2  Arnold claimed title to the oyster bed by virtue of mesne con-
veyances dating back to a seventeenth-century royal charter from Charles
21. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 723 & n.22 (Cal. 1983)
(asserting that a public trust servitude was necessarily imposed on any grant and thus the exercise of
that servitude takes nothing from the grantee).
22. For examples of articles contending that the public trust doctrine is a more recent invention,
see generally Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, I SEA
GRANT L.J. 13 (1976); Glenn J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law:
Historical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines That Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 511 (1975); Rasband, supra note 1; and Rasband, supra note 19.
23. For a discussion of this conclusion, see infra note 105.
24. Deveney, supra note 22, at 23 (quoting The Institutes of Justinian). For examples of cases
and commentators tracing the public trust doctrine back to Roman law, see State v. Central Vermont
Railway., 571 A.2d 1128, 1130 (Vt. 1989) and Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (Wash. 1987).
See also Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Trust in Western Water,
37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701, 713 (1995); Cynthia L. Koehler, Water Rights anzd the Public Trust Doctrine:
Resolution of the Mono Lake Controversy, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 541, 544-45 (1995).
25. The "foreshore" is the land between the high and low water marks of the tide. Discussing the
foreshore in English common law is analogous to discussing land under navigable waters in the United
States, because in England, the term "navigable waters" had application almost exclusively to those
waters that ebbed and flowed with the tide. See supra note 8 (discussing the meaning of the term
'navigable water" at common law in England).
26. For examples of this historical narrative, see Koehler, supra note 24, at 544-45 and Jan S.
Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign 's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People's Environmental
Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 195-200 (1980).
27. 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
28. Id. at 65.
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II, King of England, to his brother, the Duke of York.29 Ruling in favor
of Mundy, Justice Kirkpatrick held that Arnold's title was invalid, because
the English crown never had the authority to convey submerged lands.
The crown, said Kirkpatrick, was obligated to hold such lands "as a trustee
to support the title for the common use."3" In dicta, Kirkpatrick added
that New Jersey was under the same obligation as the crown: to hold land
under navigable water in trust for the people.3
The next stop in the narrative of most public trust proponents is
Martin v. Wddell's Lessee.32 There, the United States Supreme Court,
in another oyster dispute, interpreted the same crown conveyance at issue
in Arnold v. Mundy.33 Closely following Justice Kirkpatrick's language,
Justice Taney suggested that at least "since Magna Carta" the crown was
under a duty to hold land under navigable water in trust for the people and
could not alienate it.'
From Martin, the narrative proceeds to Illinois Central Railroad v.
Illinois,35 an 1892 United States Supreme Court decision. Whereas
Arnold and Martin had each focused on the crown's power to alienate land
under navigable water, Illinois Central presented the question whether a
state could do so. In 1869, the Illinois legislature granted to the Illinois
Central Railroad more than one thousand acres of submerged lands extend-
ing out one mile under Lake Michigan from Chicago's waterfront.3 6 In
1873, however, the legislature repealed the grant.37 Writing for a 4-3
majority, Justice Field held that Illinois, like the crown, had an obligation
to hold land under navigable water in trust for the people, and thus, that
the 1869 grant was voidable without compensation.38 Justice Field did,
however, admit exceptions to this trust responsibility, suggesting that grants
of parcels "for wharves, piers, docks, and other structures in aid of
commerce, and grants of parcels which, being occupied, do not
substantially impair the public interest in the lands and waters remaining"
were not violative of the state's trust responsibility.39
29. Id. at 66, 77.
30. Id. at 77.
31. Id. at 78. Specifically, Judge Kirkpatrick commented that:
The sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot, consistently with the principles of the law
of nature and the constitution of a well ordered society, make a direct and absolute grant
of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their common right. It would be
a grievance which never could be long borne by a free people.
Id.
32. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
33. Id. at 407-08.
34. Id. at 410-11.
35. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
36. Id. at 433, 439, 454.
37. Id. at 449.
38. Id. at 454-55.
39. Id. at 452.
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In sum, the public trust doctrine's proponents generally view the
evolution of the doctrine as a logical march from Roman law, through
English common law, to Arnold and Martin, and finally to Illinois Central.
Indeed, these days, most courts and commentators simply begin with
Illinois Central and then address whether the doctrine should be expanded
beyond land under navigable water to the water flowing over that land and
to other associated public amenities.'
Others of us believe the history tells quite a different story. To begin
with, detailed research into Roman law shows that the sovereign made a
variety of private grants of land under navigable water and perceived no
restraints on its power to do so.4' The same was true in England. British
barrister Stuart Moore's exhaustively researched 1888 treatise entitled A
History of the Foreshore indicates that the crown actually granted away
most of England's foreshore and that private fisheries were the rule rather
than the exception.42 During the reign of Queen Elizabeth, however, one
of her courtiers, a lawyer named Thomas Digges, developed an argument
for crown ownership of the foreshore. That argument, however, had noth-
ing to do with fulfilling a public trust and everything to do with augment-
ing the purse of the Exchequer. Digges published a tract claiming that the
foreshore was part of the royal prerogative, and thus, that no man could
hold title to any part of the foreshore absent a clear and specific grant by
the crown.43 Even though Digges's theory reasserted crown ownership
over previously granted lands, it was different than the modern public trust
doctrine. Digges never argued that the crown was bound to hold such
lands. Indeed, his theory expressly provided that the crown could grant
such lands as long as it did so clearly and explicitly.' Digges hoped that
by establishing prima facie crown ownership, the crown would be able to
40. See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 30.02(b)(1) n. 140 (listing the cases citing
to Illinois Central as the seminal public trust decision); Eric Pearson, Illinois Central and the Public
Trust Doctrine in State Law, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 713, 719-20 & nn.38-40 (1996) (noting that as of
Sept. 25, 1996, 218 state court cases had cited Illinois Central). For a discussion of the expanding
reach of the public trust doctrine, see Lazarus, supra note 5, at 649-50 and Scott W. Reed, The Public
Trust Doctrine: Is It Amphibious?, 1 J. ENvTL. L. & LITIG. 107, 116-21 (1986).
41. See Deveney, supra note 22, at 32-33; see also id. at 29 ("In actuality, the sea and the
seashore were 'common to all' only insofar as they were not yet appropriated to the use of anyone or
allocated by the state." (emphasis in original)).
42. See STUART A. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE 24, 27, 28, 33, 108, 169 (3d ed.
1888) (discussing crown grants of the foreshore); id. at 908, 908-15 (listing a vast number of private
fisheries and concluding that "[t]he true fact is, as can be shewn from the records, that all, or almost
all, tidal rivers and estuaries were in ancient times, and where the right still remains valuable still are,
covered by several fisheries in the hands of the subject"); Rasband, supra note 19, at 9-10 (discussing
this history, as related by Moore).
43. See MOORE, supra note 42, at 185-211 (reprinting Digges's tract); see also id. at 180-84,
212-24 (discussing Digges's tract). See generally Rasband, supra note 19, at 12 (discussing the
development of Digges's prima facie theory).
44. See Rasband, supra note 19, at 12 n.33 (setting forth the relevant portions of Digges's tract).
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challenge previous grants as insufficiently clear, recover portions of the
foreshore, and then regrant them at a handsome profit.45
This "prima facie theory" of crown ownership was given the cold
shoulder in England for over one hundred years. In 1786, however, it
took root in England's common law when Lord Chief Justice Hale incorpo-
rated it uncritically into his famous treatise De Jure Maris et Brachiorum
Ejusdem (Concerning the Law of the Sea and Its Arms). 6 The theory
was then incorporated into America's early common law when influential
commentators and courts relied on Hale's treatise.47 Crown or (post-
Revolution) state ownership was presumed but a clear and explicit grant of
the foreshore or a fishery could rebut that presumption.4
This background shows just how inventive and aggressive Justice
Kirkpatrick and Justice Taney were in Arnold and Martin when they,
respectively, ruled and suggested49 that the crown could never have
granted the disputed lands because it had a duty to hold those lands in trust
for the people. Their reasoning did not spring from the common law. To
the contrary, it ignored the fact that the crown had actually alienated most
of the foreshore. And, it ignored the prima facie theory, which held that
even though crown ownership was presumed, the crown still had power to
grant the foreshore as long as it did so plainly and unequivocally.
Kirkpatrick's and Taney's decisions thus did not ferret out a long-extant
principle of sovereign obligation to maintain navigable waters as a public
common. Rather, the decisions were an inventive effort to clear New
Jersey's title to its foreshore (by holding invalid the crown's pre-Revolution
conveyances) .50
45. See MOORE, supra note 42, at 180-84, 212-24 (discussing Digges's efforts to regain for the
crown foreshore, reclaimed land, and salt marsh); see also MacGrady, supra note 22, at 559-60
(describing the manner in which title hunters, including Digges, were compensated for challenging titles
on behalf of the crown).
46. See Rasband, supra note 19, at 12-14 (discussing Hale's adoption of Digges's prima facie
theory).
47. See id. at 14-17 (discussing the acceptance of Hale's treatise, and thereby the prima facie
theory, by Chancellor Kent, Joseph Angell, and a broad array of state courts).
48. See, e.g., Peck v. Lockwood, 5 Day 22, 27 (Conn. 1811) ("[A] man may have an exclusive
privilege of fishing in an arm of the sea; but such right is not to be presumed; it must be proved
... ."); Brink v. Richtmyer, 14 Johns. 255, 258 (N.Y. 1817) (applying the prima faie theory to con-
clude that the grant at issue did not show "an intention in the government to grant any fishery");
McKenzie v. Hulet, 4 N.C. 578, 579 (1817). The court in Hulet noted:
The right of taking fish in the sea ... belongs to every one as a common of Piscary; but
even this may be restrained, where an individual hath gained exclusive property. And this
may be acquired by grant or prescription[;] but it being considered as a royalty, it would
not pass without special and express words.
Id. (citations omitted). See generally Rasband, supra note 19, at 17 (discussing the application of the
prima facie theory in early American common law).
49. See infra note 51 (discussing how Justice Taney's opinion did not specifically reach this issue).
50. See Deveney, supra note 22, at 55-56 ("As a policy decision to reclaim for the people the
coastal area of the state which would otherwise have been entirely in private hands, Arnold v. Mundy
is an impressive display ofjudicial dexterity; as history it is nonsense." (emphasis in original)); Michael
1999] 1343
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Inventing a trust obligation for a monarch in order to clear a new
state's title is not what critics of public trust doctrine find most disturbing
about the two opinions. The greater concern is that the opinions set the
stage for Illinois Central's application of the same trust responsibility to a
democratically elected state government. This is particularly true of the
opinion of Justice Kirkpatrick, which opined that no sovereign could "make
a direct and absolute grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the
citizens of their common right."5' Equating the crown and a state legisla-
ture was flawed in two senses. First, as a historical matter, it ignored the
distinction between crown and parliament. Whatever the power of the
crown to convey the foreshore, it had always been clear at common law
that parliament had the power to grant the foreshore.52 And the states,
of course, inherited the sovereign attributes of both crown and parliament.
Second, equating the need for limiting the crown's power to divest the
citizens of their common right with a need for imposing a like limitation
on state legislatures ignores the basic political principle that in a democracy
the citizens themselves are sovereign. 3
B. Oyster Wars' Contribution to the Debate on the Origins of the Public
Trust Doctrine
1. Contextualizing the Foundational Public Trust Cases.-With these
competing historical narratives in place, it is possible to discuss McCay's
contribution to the public trust literature.' That contribution is two-fold.
L. Rosen, Public and Private Ownership Rights in Lands under Navigable Waters: The
Governmental/Proprietary Distinction, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 561,571 n.67 (1982) (calling Kirkpatrick's
conclusion a "wholly fabricated statement of law").
51. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (1821). Taney was more careful in Martin. Although he
liberally adopted Kirkpatrick's reasoning, he concluded that the Court need not reach the issue of the
crown's power to grant land under navigable water because the particular conveyance to the Duke of
York did not intend to convey private property. See Martin v. Waddell Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367,
410-12 (1842); see also Rasband, supra note 19, at 26-27 (discussing Taney's reasoning). Moreover,
Taney appeared to disagree with Kirkpatrick that the trust responsibility would apply to state legis-
latures:
[W]hen the Revolution took place, the people of each state became themselves sovereign;
and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils
under them for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the
Constitution to the general government. A grant made by their authority must therefore
manifestly be tried and determined by different principles from those which apply to
grants of the British crown, when the title is held by a single individual in trust for the
whole nation.
Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410-11.
52. See Rasband, supra note 19, at 16 n.48, 24 n.80 (citing a variety of commentators and cases
for this proposition, including later New Jersey cases).
53. See supra note 51 (Justice Taney's statement).
54. It is worth noting that McCay's purpose does not appear to be advocacy of a particular norma-
tive view of the public trust doctrine. On the one hand, McCay essentially agrees with the historical
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First, as advertised, McCay's anthropological approach to the major court
cases like Arnold and Martin does bring to light a number of facts that
broaden and enhance understanding of the foundational public trust cases.
For example, one of the common criticisms of Arnold is that the decision's
author, Justice Kirkpatrick, was "an obscure and unprepared state court
judge," not up to resolving the case's legal complexities." This sugges-
tion derives from Kirkpatrick's comment in Arnold that he had not been
able to perform as much research as he would have liked.56 But McCay
shows that Kirkpatrick was neither obscure nor unprepared. He was one
of the most eminent real estate lawyers of the time,57 and he had already
authored another key opinion on public rights in the fishery. 8 Another
historical nugget McCay digs up is the fact that in 1824 the New Jersey
assembly declined to reappoint Kirkpatrick to the state supreme court.
5 9
McCay speculates on whether "broader-based dissatisfaction with his ruling
in Arnold v. Mundy ... played a role in his dismissal."'
McCay's work on the historical connection between Arnold and Martin
is another example of how her contextual approach provides useful insights
into the origins of the public trust doctrine. McCay relates how soon after
Arnold the Board of General Proprietors of East New Jersey, which before
Arnold had claimed title to most of New Jersey's shorelands,6" began to
plot another legal challenge.62 Their first move was to commission a tract
arguing their case for title from the crown. Among the authors were Peter
Jay, Elias Van Arsdale, and James Kent, chancellor of New York's equity
courts and author of the most influential legal treatise of the nineteenth
approach of the doctrine's critics, briefly recapitulating the legal history from Roman law to Digges
to Kirkpatrick and Taney, and calling it "a story of doctrinal invention, and reinvention, and invention
again." P. 69. On the other hand, McCay argues that it is "misleading to criticize Taney and
Kirkpatrick for misreading English common law. They gave the appearance of continuity with English
common law in their decisions despite profound change in their interpretations partly because this is
what good common law judges did." P. 76.
55. MacGrady, supra note 22, at 590-91. I have made that criticism myself. See Rasband,
supra note 19, at 23-25.
56. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 69-70.
57. Pp. 48, 74.
58. Pp. 30-34 (discussing Kirkpatrick's opinion in Shepard v. Leverson, 2 N.J.L. 391 (1808));
see also infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (discussing the Shepard case).
59. Pp. 56-57.
60. P. 57.
61. Proprietorships were one of the means by which the English crown planted and developed col-
onies. In the case of New Jersey, Charles II granted a vast area to his brother James who in turn
granted the proprietorship over New Jersey to John, Lord Berkeley and Sir George Carteret. They,
and their successors in interest, became the proprietors of New Jersey, divided into East and West
Jersey. The proprietors were granted enormous governmental powers. See JOHN E. POMFRET, THE
NEW JERSEY PROPRIETORS AND THEIR LANDS at ix (1964). They also thought they had been granted
the right of the soil, until Kirkpatrick and Taney opined to the contrary. See supra notes 27-34, 51 and
accompanying text (discussing their respective opinions in Arnold and Martin).
62. P. 60.
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century.63 McCay reveals that the advice of these scholars was to get a
test case to the federal courts on diversity grounds. Thus, it was "no
accident that ten years later [in Martin] the person who claimed title
through the Proprietors and challenged the leases held by New Jersey
oystermen ...was a New Yorker."' McCay's uncovering of the close
linkage between Arnold and Martin suggests that Taney's tracking of
Kirkpatrick's reasoning in Arnold may have had as much to do with princi-
ples of repose as with the persuasive nature of Kirkpatrick's argument.65
2. Using the Oyster Industry as a Case Study for Public Trust
Principles.-McCay's second contribution to the literature on the public
trust doctrine's development is her focus on the oyster industry. As
discussed above, the laws, customs, and practices of the industry provide
an ideal case study for the public trust doctrine because oysters are part of
the fishery yet are easily susceptible to private ownership. Studying the
oyster fishery thus provides insight into early legal, political, and social
understandings about the state's authority to privatize a resource at the very
core of the public trust doctrine. McCay's exploration of New Jersey's
laws and customs is a useful step in that direction, but only a step. Oyster
Wrs expends little effort exploring the laws and customs of the oyster
fishery in other states and thus misses an opportunity for adding another
layer of context to its review of the development of the public trust
doctrine.'
a. The dispute between oyster tongers and oyster planters.-To
understand the relationship between the laws governing the oyster industry
and the public trust doctrine, it is first necessary to understand something
about the oyster fishery. McCay thus appropriately begins by describing
oystering in New Jersey, noting that in the nineteenth century it was not at
all a parochial or unobserved industry, but a "multi-million-dollar" one.67
63. P. 60.
64. P. 61.
65. This conclusion seems particularly plausible in light of Taney's disagreement with Kirkpatrick
on whether the states had the same public trust obligations as the crown. See supra note 57.
66. To be fair, McCay is not particularly concerned with the historical development of the trust
doctrine per se, but with its implications for resource allocation. P. xxiii; see also supra Part III
(discussing McCay's critique of the tragedy of the commons). Thus, her choice not to explore beyond
New Jersey is not necessarily a failing.
67. P. 7. Without this historical perspective, one might guess that oystering was of concern to
few and thus unlikely to yield significant insights into nineteenth-century natural resources policy. In
fact, in the mid-nineteenth century, oystering was a significant part of the economy. Thus, an 1853
article in the New York Herald relates that over 50,000 people were employed in the oyster industry
in the vicinity of New York and observes that the industry was one in which "almost every person feels
an interest. . . ." The Oyster Trade of New York, N.Y. HERALD, Mar. 12, 1853, at 7. And the dis-
covery of a new oyster bed in New York waters made the front page of the New York Times in 1859.
See The Great Oyster Bed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1859, at 1.
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Originally, most oystermen produced oysters for market just as any other
fisherman: they "fished" for oysters by taking them from the large natural
oyster reefs or banks that formed along the coast.6" These oyster fisher-
men were often known as "tongers" because of the tongs they used to grab
the oysters.69 As the natural beds began to decline from harvest pressure
and as markets expanded, other oystermen, generally known as planters,
began transplanting some of the oysters they collected from the natural
beds onto other areas of the bottom.7" This transplanting practice made
the oysters more marketable by allowing them to further grow and fatten;
the practice also guaranteed the planter a supply for the market.7' In
theory, no particular tension arises between planters and tongers. In
practice, however, disputes were common, as tongers made frequent raids
of the planted beds. The resulting battles between planters and tongers,
both literal and legal, are what gives Oyster Mi~rs its title.
One of the earliest such oyster wars resulted in the New Jersey
Supreme Court's opinion in Shepard v. Leverson. 2 Shepard and other
tongers had taken oysters that Leverson had planted on barren ground in
a river that otherwise produced numerous oysters.73 Like other tongers
of the time, Shepard justified the raid by arguing that the entire ocean was
a public fishery and attempts to stake off a planted area were illegitimate.
As he and other tongers saw it, no one was entitled to privatize any portion
of the commons.' Leverson made the Lockean argument that he was
entitled to exclusive rights to the oysters he had labored to plant.' The
court had to decide whether Shepard was a pirate or merely a lucky
fisherman.
Two of the three justices concluded that Leverson could indeed
appropriate an area of submerged lands for private use as long as the lands
68. See PAUL DEBROCHA, ON THE OYSTER-INDUSTRIES OF THE UNITED STATES 297 (1876)
(defining a natural oyster bed). For thorough explorations of the nineteenth-century oyster industry,
see BROOKS, supra note 10; DEBROCHA, supra; ERNEST INGERSOLL, THE OYSTER, SCALLOP, CLAM,
MUSSEL AND ABALONE INDUSTRIES (1887) [hereinafter INGERSOLL, OYSTER, SCALLOP, CLAM];
ERNEST INGERSOLL, THE HISTORY AND PRESENT CONDITION OF THE OYSTER INDUSTRY (1881); and
H.F. MOORE, OYSTERS AND METHODS OF OYSTER CULTURE (1900).
69. See pp. 15-18, 128.
70. See pp. 10-11, 51.
71. See pp. 10-11. In addition to planting, oystermen worked to start oyster crops from scratch
by "cultching." Cultching included a variety of methods designed to catch floating shellfish larvae,
the most common of which was to spread out on tidelands empty oyster shells or shell fragments on
which the floating oyster larvae could catch and begin to grow. See generally MOORE, supra note 68,
at 296-97, 305 ("By these terms [cultch, collectors, stool] is understood any firm and clean body placed
in the water for the purpose of affording attachment to the spat or young oyster. A great variety of
objects have been suggested and used for this purpose, both here and abroad.").
72. 2 N.J.L. 369 (1808).
73. Id. at 369-70.
74. Id. at 370.
75. Id. at 370-71; see also p. 31 (discussing Leverson's argument).
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were barren of oysters.76 Interestingly, Justice Kirkpatrick disagreed. He
recognized that the "business of planting oysters in these waters has been
carried on to great extent" and expressed the "wish" that "it could have
been supported and rendered permanent," but concluded that "in a common
fishery, . ..no man can appropriate to himself any particular shoal, bed,
or spot, to the exclusion of others."' Although Kirkpatrick did not say
that New Jersey could not authorize such appropriations, his strong view
that the fishery must remain open to the public certainly foreshadowed his
invention of the public trust doctrine in Arnold v. Mundy.
As it turned out, the courts did not take Kirkpatrick's view and instead
adopted the approach that planters were protected as long as they had
planted their oysters in a spot where oysters did not grow naturally.7"
Private property could be created out of the commons, but "only where the
commons [were] barren."7 9 Planters, however, could take only some
comfort in the creation of this common-law principle. Constant vigilance
of their submerged beds was difficult, and tongers often took planted
oysters on the pretense that the oysters had been planted on a natural
bed. °
b. State oyster leasing.-Given the general decline in the natural
beds and the market advantages of planted oysters, New Jersey began to
see an advantage to affording greater legal recognition to the planters'
oyster beds. Thus, in 1820, it passed a law allowing exclusive rights in
planted oysters."' This law was reflective of a general trend in the first
half of the nineteenth century as a number of states passed laws protecting
planted oyster beds. 2 New Jersey's statutory solution, as reflected in the
76. Id. at 373-74 (opinions of Rossell & Pennington, JJ.). Leverson had planted the oysters in
a spot where they did not previously grow. To Justice Rossell, this constituted an appropriation of sub-
merged lands barren of oysters, and thus he would have ruled for Leverson. Justice Pennington took
a different view of whether the spot where Leverson had planted was sufficiently barren to warrant pri-
vatization. To Pennington, the submerged lands were not truly barren because Leverson had failed to
demonstrate that oysters would never grow naturally in that location. Presumably, if Leverson could
have demonstrated that the planted area would remain barren of natural oysters, Justice Pennington
would have recognized his claim. Id. at 374-75 (opinions of Rossell & Pennington, JJ.); see also p.
32.
77. Shepard, 2 N.J.L. at 373.
78. See pp. 35-36.
79. P. 32.
80. See pp. 36-39.
81. See An Act for the Preservation of Clams and Oysters, §§ 9, 12, 13, 1820 N.J. Laws 162,
164-65; p. 59.
82. See, e.g., An Act Concerning Fish, Oysters, and Game, ch. 569, § 7, 1851 Del. Laws 582,
583; An Act Concerning the Planting of Oysters, ch. 152, § 1, 1848 Mass. Acts 685, 685; An Act
to Encourage and Protect the Planting of Oysters, ch. 142, 1849 Me. Laws 124; An Act Concerning
Oysters and Terrapins and the Penalties in Regard to Them, ch. 86, § 14, 1847 Va. Acts 71, 74 (all
allowing oystermen to stake off and plant oysters in certain tidelands, but forbidding them to enclose
natural oyster beds).
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1820 Act, essentially tracked the common law. 3 Oystermen were permit-
ted to stake off, and plant oysters on, submerged lands as long as those
lands did not contain a natural oyster bed. 4 As McCay tells it, whether
as a matter of common law or statute, this was the one sacred and inviolate
rule of the oyster industry: the natural beds of oysters were to remain open
to the public.'
c. Public access to the natural beds and its implications for the
public trust doctrine.-If McCay's description of the law is correct, what
does that say about early conceptions of the state's public trust responsibili-
ties? Allowing individuals to claim private rights in submerged lands may
initially appear contrary to the notion that the crown or state must hold
land under navigable water in trust for the people. In fact, however, it fits
quite well within Illinois Central's exception for grants that promote the
public's interest in navigation, commerce, or fishing, or that do not sub-
stantially impair the public's interest in the lands and waters remaining.'
Allowing oyster planting on barren ground does not interfere with
navigation,' and it actually promotes commerce and the fishery. Thus,
leasing private planting grounds would not be a violation of public trust
principles as long as McCay is correct that the state allowed only barren
lands, and not natural beds, to be privatized.
Of course, to say that New Jersey did not violate public trust princi-
ples by leasing barren grounds for planting is not the same as saying that
New Jersey was abiding by the public trust doctrine. Although one could
argue that New Jersey left open its natural beds because it believed it was
bound to do so by the public trust doctrine, that is only one potential
explanation for the state's refusal to grant private rights in natural oyster
beds. Another possibility, and a much less speculative one, is that New
Jersey's legislature, as the democratically elected representative of the
people, believed it could do with the oysters whatever it thought best for
the public, and that it simply decided the beds should remain open.
83. See pp. 59-60; see also An Act for the Protection of Persons Who Have Planted Oysters in
the Navigable Waters of this State, § 1, 1821 N.J. Laws 20, 20-21 (extending the geographic scope
of protection).
84. See pp. 59-60; see also supra note 82 (citing exemplary statutes).
85. See pp. 6, 32, 38.
86. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453, 455-56 (1892); see also supra text
accompanying note 39 (discussing these exceptions to the general prohibition on state grants of trust
resources).
87. In theory, the stakes used to mark the planting beds could disrupt navigation. But most states
allowed or required the beds to be marked in another fashion when the stakes did threaten to interfere
with navigation. See, e.g., An Act for the Preservation of Oysters and Other Shell Fish within this
State, § 10, 1844 R.I. Pub. Laws 88, 92 (requiring the marking of planted oyster beds with "stakes
or buoys").
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McCay identifies these possibilities as two of the "major meanings" of the
public trust doctrine that have long been in competition with one another:
"The first emphasizes common use rights, the second supports the notion
of state ownership and a weakened sense of the inalienability of public
rights."' This conclusion, however, too quickly imports modern public
trust notions into the nineteenth century. In fact, prior to Illinois Central
there is very little support, other than Kirkpatrick's Arnold v. Mundy dicta,
for the idea that state legislatures were legally bound to hold land under
navigable water or the fishery in trust for the public.89
Moreover, McCay's discussion of New Jersey's law indicates that,
despite the fishery being a core trust resource, the legislature always
understood that it had the power to create a private fishery. This under-
standing is plain because New Jersey did so on a number of occasions.
McCay, for example, notes that "[c)ommercial and subsistence seine
fisheries for shad and other [migratory] species were almost completely
privatized" and were "[r]ecognized and supported by acts of the
legislature."' Likewise McCay tells the story of an oyster war that
precipitated the 1874 case of Wboley v. Campbell.9 There, the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court upheld a verdict against Wooley for taking naturally
occurring oysters from Campbell's leased bed.' The court decided that
even if the lease covered a portion of what had been the common fishery,
the state had the power to alienate it.93
Another indication of the common understanding that the state was not
obligated to hold the oyster fishery in trust for all the people are the
instances McCay finds of state legislation granting power to local associa-
tions and townships to control the oyster fishery.' New Jersey was not
alone in this practice; other states also granted control over shellfish beds
to local towns.95 Moreover, starting in 1864, the New Jersey legislature
88. P. xxxi. McCay argues that a third meaning of the doctrine arose with "the rise of public
advocacy and environmental law, pioneered by Joseph Sax." P. xxxi (citations omitted). This,
however, is less a third meaning and more a harking back to the first meaning. McCay's division of
the public trust is an echo of Carol Rose's conclusion that the public trust
has gravitated between two different versions of the public: one is the "public" that is
constituted as a governmental authority, whose ability to manage and dispose of trust
property is plenary. But the other is the public at large, which despite its unorganized
state seems to have some property-like rights in the lands held in trust for it-rights that
may be asserted against the public's own representatives ...
CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 121-22 (1994).
89. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
90. P. 84; see also pp. 84-91 (discussing court rulings affirming private shad fisheries).
91. 37 N.J.L. 163 (1874).
92. Id. at 169; see pp. 106-07.
93. Wooley, 37 N.J.L. at 169; see p. 107.
94. Pp. xviii, 105-06, 198.
95. See, e.g., An Act for Encouraging and Regulating Fisheries, ch. 1, § 1, 1838 Conn. Pub. Acts
269, 269; An Act in Addition to an Act, Entitled "An Act to Prevent the Destruction of Oysters, and
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appointed a series of riparian commissions to survey and sell tidewater
lands.' The bulk of the commissions' tideland grants were to riparians
for economic development-filling, wharfing out, etc.-but on a number
of occasions the commissions also granted away natural oyster beds. 7
McCay tells the story of how these grants of natural beds precipitated a
series of violent oyster wars around the turn of the century in which the
courts upheld the grantees' rights.9" Even though in 1906 the legislature
specifically ordered the riparian commission to stop granting riparian tracts
in shellfish bearing grounds, it did so not to conform to a public trust
mandate but in response to public outcry-a classic democratic response to
resource misallocation. 9
McCay suggests that Woley, and presumably these other instances of
privatization, show a "policy shift from a view of the state as a trustee or
public-minded sovereign expounded by Kirkpatrick and Taney, to a very
different interpretation of sovereignty, where the state legislature functions
just as the Proprietors did, able to grant lands with little concern about
public claims. " " In fact, however, what Woley and these other exam-
ples show is that Kirkpatrick's Arnold decision (and not Taney's decision
in Martin which actually advocated state sovereignty over its submerged
lands ' 1) was an isolated departure from a broad-based understanding that
the state was free to alienate land under navigable water and the fishery as
long as it did so explicitly.
McCay's own research thus indicates that the "sacred" rule that the
public should always have access to the natural beds of oysters was not as
sacred as she initially suggests. Further evidence for this point comes from
other states. Although McCay does not address this issue, at least two
states during the nineteenth century went further than New Jersey and
passed laws providing for widespread grants of private rights in natural
Other Shell Fish in this Commonwealth," ch. 129, § 1, 1828 Mass. Acts 209, 209-10 (both delegating
authority to the inhabitants of coastal towns to grant permits to take oysters from the town's beds); An
Act to Prevent the Destruction of Oysters and Other Shell Fish, Throughout This Commonwealth, ch.
76, 1795 Mass. Acts 348 ("Whereas oysters and other shell fish have long been considered the property
of the towns wherein their beds are situated respectively . . . ."); An Act for the Preservation of
Certain Fish, ch. 179, § 2, 1821 Me. Laws 891, 891. New Jersey and other states also exhibited an
understanding that they owned their tidelands by passing laws excluding nonresidents of the state from
taking any shellfish from state bedlands. See, e.g., An Act for the Preservation of Certain Shell
Fisheries Within This State, ch. 209, § 1, 4 Del. Laws 568, 568 (1812); An Act for the Preservation
of Oysters, § 5, 1798 N.J. Laws 263, 263. Such acts were found to be constitutional under the
Commerce Clause in McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 394-97 (1876).
96. See pp. 99-100.
97. See pp. 91, 98-104.
98. See pp. 116-46 (describing violent disputes in Delaware Bay and on the Mullica River).
99. See pp. 141, 145.
100. P. 106.
101. See supra note 51 (discussing Taney's opinion).
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oyster beds.0 2  This evidence of privatization of natural beds is an
important point with respect to the origins of the public trust doctrine. If
New Jersey and other states in the nineteenth century were granting away
natural beds-a fishery at the core of the traditional public trust doctrine-it
seems unlikely that the doctrine was well-recognized when Kirkpatrick,
Taney, and Field wrote their foundational opinions. If the public trust
doctrine were firmly embedded in the common law, such grants of private
fisheries would have been routinely voided by the courts rather than merely
protested by oystermen.
Although McCay may not have set out to accomplish this mission,
Oyster Wrs' review of New Jersey's shellfish industry creates even greater
skepticism about the antiquity of the public trust doctrine and its status as
a venerable legal principle. 3 What Oyster Wrs shows is that in the
102. See An Act in Amendment of Chapter 97, Title XVI of the Revised Statutes, "Of Private and
Several Oyster Fisheries," ch. 513, § 3, 1864 R.I. Acts & Resolves 161, 162 (allowing, again, the
leasing of natural beds); An Act for the Preservation of Oysters and Other Shell Fish Within This State,
§ 2, 1852 R.I. Acts & Resolves 36, 37 (repealing 1844 Act); State v. Cozzens, 2 R.I. 561 (1850)
(affirming Rhode Island's legislation allowing privatization of natural beds); An Act in Amendment of
an Act Entitled "An Act for the Preservation of Oysters and Other Shell Fish Within This State," §§
9-10, 1844 R.I. Pub. Laws 88, 91-92 (allowing state shellfish commissioners to "lease to such person
or persons, for a term not less than five, nor more than ten years in duration, any piece of land covered
by the public waters of this State . . .as a private or several oyster ground or oyster fishery, for the
planting of oysters" but encouraging them not to lease oyster beds which, in their judgment were better
left as part of the common fishery (emphasis added)); see also An Act to Amend an Act Entitled "An
Act to Encourage the Cultivation of Oysters," § 5, 1879 Laws of Wash. T. 118, 119-20 (allowing citi-
zens to claim exclusive rights to natural oyster beds); United States v. Washington, 873 F. Supp. 1422,
1440 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (discussing laws Washington passed in 1895 to allow the "private purchase
of tidelands, even when those tidelands contained natural shellfish beds"); Sequim Bay Canning Co.
v. Bugge, 94 P. 922 (Wash. 1908) (holding that the owner of the tidelands owned the clams embedded
within the soil).
103. The light Oyster Wars sheds on the public trust doctrine's origins is not the only instance in
which McCay's research may have an impact on a legal debate. Her work also has application to a
case recently decided by the Ninth Circuit, the resolution of which turned in part on whether, during
the first half of the nineteenth century, eastern coastal states allowed natural beds to be privatized. The
issue arose in connection with the interpretation of a series of treaties negotiated in 1853 by the United
States with the Indian tribes who dwelled in the Puget Sound region of what is now the State of
Washington. Under the treaties, the Indians relinquished most of their territory and were moved onto
reservations. The treaties, however, provided the Indians with certain off-reservation fishing rights:
"The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is further secured to said
Indians, in common with all citizens of the territory,... : Provided, however, That they shall not take
shell fish from any beds staked or cultivated by citizens. . . ." United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d
630 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original). In 1979, the Supreme Court interpreted this treaty pro-
vision to mean that the tribes were entitled to a "fair share" (up to 50%) of the salmon and steelhead
runs in Washington, and not simply to an equal opportunity to fish as the State of Washington had
argued. See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 685 (1979).
In 1989, the tribes filed litigation seeking a declaration of a similar right to take shellfish. See
United States v. Washington, 873 F. Supp. 1422, 1427-28 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd in significant
part, 135 F.3d 618 (9th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. Dec. 22, 1998)
(No. 98-1052). Because Washington had privatized a good portion of its tidelands and natural shellfish
1352
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lead up to Illinois Central and even in its immediate aftermath, New Jersey
understood that its democratically elected legislature was free to alienate a
resource at the very core of the public trust doctrine, namely, shellfish
embedded in land under navigable water. Indeed, if McCay had looked
beyond New Jersey, this point would have been even clearer, because some
other states were even more aggressive than New Jersey in privatizing the
oyster resource."° Why is this important? Again, because if the antiq-
uity of the public trust doctrine is a mirage, the legitimacy of both its
countermajoritarian content and its power to circumvent the Constitution's
taking protections is undermined. 5
III. The Oyster Industry and the Tragedy of the Commons
Although written as a tract against uncontrolled population growth,
Garrett Hardin's The Tragedy of the Commons has become one of the most
frequently cited articles in natural resource law scholarship." Its thesis
is straightforward: Because any unconsumed portion of a common resource
is open to others, individuals who wish to maximize their gain have no
incentive to preserve the resource. Thus, any resource-for example, a
fishery, a pasture, a national park, or a watercourse-which remains open
beds in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the tribes' request was vigorously opposed by
the property owners and shellfish farmers who owned tidelands containing shellfish beds. I
represented, and continue to represent, the group of shellfish farmers who intervened as defendants in
the litigation. Stated simplistically, the position of the shellfish farmers was that the tribes had no right
to take shellfish from the farmers' property because their beds were staked and cultivated and the treaty
language specifically prohibited Indians from taking "shellfish from any beds staked or cultivated by
citizens." The tribes argued, however, that in 1853 when the treaties were negotiated no state allowed
natural oyster beds to be staked or cultivated because oysters were part of the common fishery. The
tribes thus asserted that the "beds staked or cultivated" treaty language only protected oyster farmers
who staked or cultivated their oysters on barren tidelands.
Without belaboring a number of arguments against this interpretation, suffice it to say that it was
largely accepted by both the district court and the Ninth Circuit. See Washington, 873 F. Supp. at
1422; Washington, 135 F.3d at 618. Although McCay nominally supports the tribes in her assertion
that the sacred rule of the oyster fishery was that natural beds were to remain open, the on-the-ground
reality she describes does not. See supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (noting that Rhode Island and Washington
Territory passed laws providing for the widespread grants of private rights in natural oyster beds).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23. The legitimacy of the doctrine's counter-
majoritarian power is diminished because if the doctrine were not around at the close of the eighteenth
century, it is difficult to locate it in the federal Constitution. For additional discussion of why the pub-
lic trust doctrine cannot be located in the federal Constitution, see Rasband, supra note 1, at 337-38
n.26, 365-66 and Rasband, supra note 19, at 65, 74 n.271. If the doctrine is of recent vintage, it is
also more difficult for a court invalidating a grant of trust resources to suggest that the granting legisla-
ture was aware of the limits on its granting power. Moreover, from the grantee's perspective, if she
had no notice of a putative public trust easement, revocation of the grant is more likely an unconstitu-
tional taking.
106. My review of the limited Wesffaw database titled "Journals and Law Reviews Combined"
found 278 articles citing Hardin's The Tragedy of the Commons. The more limited Lexis "LAWREV;
ALLREV" database found 217 citations.
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to the entire public will eventually be overexploited." °  Unfortunately,
whether it is the depletion of ocean fisheries,'08 the overgrazing of west-
ern rangelands, °9 the overcrowding of Yosemite National Park,"0 or
myriad other such situations, experience with natural resources has borne
out Hardin's theory rather remorselessly.
Despite this history, McCay suggests that the tragedy of the commons
theory can be "misleading if not harmful," and that this conclusion is
exhibited by the oyster industry."' The history of the nineteenth-century
oyster fishery, however, is replete with examples of open access leading
to the depletion and destruction of natural oyster beds."' McCay herself
discusses several such examples in New Jersey."3  Indeed, in 1891,
William Brooks, who was one of the leading experts on the oyster industry
in the latter half of the nineteenth century wrote:
I know of many destroyed oyster fisheries, and I know of a few that
have been rebuilt, and I find one cause common to all failures and
as common to all successes. In the first instance, the fishery has
been common property, its preservation everybody's business-that
is nobody's-and consequently it has not been preserved. "14
It is also no coincidence that so many of the laws passed with respect to the
107. See Hardin, supra note 15, at 1244. The tragedy of the commons, of course, can take a sig-
nificant period of time to occur because demand may be minimal. Eventually, however, when the
demand for a particular resource becomes great enough, open access to that resource will result in its
complete consumption. See id.
108. See generally RonaldJ. Rychlak, OceanAquaculture, 8 FORDHAMENVTL. L.J. 497,497-500
(1997) (arguing that "[a]lmost everyone now agrees that depletion of the world's fisheries is one of the
most pressing environmental issues of our time").
109. See generally George Cameron Coggins & Margaret Lindberg-Johnson, The Law of Public
Rangeland Management II The Commons and the TaylorAct, 13 ENVTL. L. 1, 3-40 (1982) (discussing
the history of managing the western range as a commons).
110. See John Ritter, Visitors Crowd Out Yosemite Sights, DET. NEWs, Aug. 16, 1998, at A2
(noting plans to alleviate the burdens placed on Yosemite's infrastructure by vehicular traffic); Joby
Warrick, Strict Limits on Cars Set for 3 National Parks, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1997, at A14
(discussing the implementation of rail and bus systems to ease traffic jams at Yosemite, Grand Canyon,
and Zion national parks).
111. P. 189.
112. See INGERSOLL, OYSTER, SCALLOP, CLAM, supra note 68, at 512-20 (discussing examples
of declines in the oyster resource in all of the eastern coastal states); id. at 514 ("[O]ysters growing nat-
urally along the upper coast of Massachusetts were all valuable to the early settlers, who quickly
exhausted them, not only through use as food, but by digging up the shells to be burned into lime.");
id. at 516 (noting that certain oysters in Long Island Sound "are no longer. . . manifestly through
over-raking, in defiance of law").
113. See, e.g., p. 124; pp. 131-32 (both describing a rush of oystermen who completely depleted
a newly opened oyster bed within a couple of weeks); p. 16 (noting the general decline in the oyster
fishery due to over-fishing).
114. BROOKS, supra note 10, at 166-67; see also id. at 164-65 (describing the decline of the oyster
industry in Maryland's Chesapeake Bay because "demand has outgrown the natural supply"); id. at 173
("Everyone knows that our beds have deteriorated because they have been excessively fished .... ).
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oyster fishery were titled acts "for the preservation" of oysters." 5 Many
of the laws were passed in direct response to overexploitation. Indeed,
McCay discusses several examples: laws limiting the open season for tak-
ing oysters," 6 laws requiring oystermen to cull from their catch small
seed oysters and to return them to the oyster bed,' and Luddite laws
limiting harvesters to rakes and tongs and prohibiting more efficient
dredges."'
A. McCay's Criticism of the Tragedy of the Commons As Incomplete
If Hardin's tragedy of the commons thesis so clearly fits the history
of the oyster industry, why does McCay insist that Hardin's theory is
"misleading"? Although I have some trepidation about neatly disentangling
McCay's argument," 9 she appears to advance two reasons, neither of
which justifies the "misleading" label. First, McCay seems to argue that
the tragedy of the commons thesis is misleading because it is incomplete.
It fails to consider a variety of other explanations for diminishment of
natural resources.'20 McCay thus asserts that "[o]ne of the goals" of
Oyster Wrs "is to raise questions about things we take for granted, like
the idea that open access is the cause of overexploitation."'2' But
Hardin's theory is not that open access is the cause of overexploitation.
The idea of the tragedy of the commons is that open access will cause
115. See, e.g., An Act for the Preservation of Clams and Oysters, 1820 N.J. Laws 162; An Act
to Prevent the Destruction of Rockfish and Oysters, ch. 620, 8 Pa. Laws 10 (1771); An Act for the
Preservation of Oysters Within This State, 1822 R.I. Pub. Laws 508.
116. Pp. 8-9, 121; see, e.g., An Act for the Preservation of Clams and Oysters, § 1, 1820 N.J.
Laws 162, 162-63.
117. P. 121, 121-25 (discussing New Jersey's cull laws that required "tongers or dredgers to cull
their catch while on the natural beds, returning undersized and dead oysters, empty shells, and other
'refuse' back to the grounds to provide cultch [a stable platform to which oyster larvae can attach and
grow]"); see also An Act Supplementary to the Act Entitled "An Act for the Preservation of Certain
Shell Fisheries Within This State," ch. 343, § 2, 8 Del. Laws 383, 383-84 (1835) (Delaware cull law);
An Act in Amendment of Chapter 96 of Title XVI of the Revised Statutes, "Of Free and Common
Oyster Fisheries," ch. 633, § 3, 1866 R.I. Pub. Laws 245, 246 (Rhode Island cull law).
118. Pp. 17-19; see, e.g., An Act for the Preservation of Clams and Oysters, chs. 162-63, § 2,
1820 N.J. Laws 162, 163 (prohibiting raking with a dredge); An Act for the Preservation of Oysters
Within This State, § 1, 1822 R.I. Pub. Laws 508, 508 (prohibiting the use of any instrument that has
the tendency to destroy the oyster beds); An Act to Reduce into One the Acts Now in Force, to Prevent
the Destruction of Oysters Within this Commonwealth, ch. 255, § 2, 1819 Va. Acts 314, 314
(prohibiting the use of any instrument other than a tong to drag, scoop, or rake oysters).
119. One of the frustrations of Oyster Wars is that McCay's critique of the tragedy of the
commons must be picked up in insights scattered throughout its approximately 230 pages. She never
attempts a point-by-point criticism of Hardin or an explication of her own theory.
120. See p. 153 ("Constructs such as 'the public' or 'open access' or the bio-economic and other
models represented by the phrase 'tragedy of the commons' may be too broad or misleading to be
useful in understanding and explaining particular situations and events.").
121. P. 198.
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overexploitation if nothing is done to limit that access. 2 In other words,
open access is a potential cause of resource abuse. Hardin never claimed
that overexploitation is impossible, or even improbable, where access is
closed or limited.
Nevertheless, McCay is critical of the tragedy of the commons
because, she says, it fails to account for other causes of resource decline.
McCay argues that much of the decline in the New Jersey oyster resource
was caused not by overharvest but by industrial development and
pollution."2  McCay also writes that "[i]n the history I have sketched,
the issue was less open access to the shellfisheries than it was
mismanagement by local and state governments-the tragedy of a
mismanaged commons." 2 4 If only New Jersey had managed the oyster
resource better-through more effective leasing programs or culling rules,
through better regulation of pollution, or perhaps through devolution of
control of the oyster resource to local communities-the resource decline
could have been averted.
Perhaps McCay's point is contextual: one cannot understand the
decline in New Jersey's oyster fishery by simply saying that open access
to oysters led to overexploitation of the resource. The real explanation for
the decline is more nuanced. To the extent McCay is suggesting that
policymakers be more specific when discussing the problem of resource
decline rather than misleadingly casting those problems at the doorstep of
the tragedy of the commons,"z her point is hard to dispute, but it posits
a misapplication of Hardin's theory. Hardin never claimed that the tragedy
of the commons explained all resource decline.
McCay thus meets her goal of debunking the notion that "open access
is the cause of overexploitation," lI but only because it is a straw man.
The fact that government management of the oyster commons either contri-
buted to, or was unable to avert, the decline of the oyster fishery does not
mean that it is "misleading" to say that in the absence of any management
122. See Hardin, supra note 15, at 1247-48.
123. See p. 155 (noting that Northern New Jersey's oyster industry declined primarily because
"this was the region of heaviest shipping, industrialization, and population growth in the nation").
Pollution, of course, is really just a different use of the oyster commons. Open access to the sea as
a receptacle of industrial waste simply results in overexploitation of the oyster resource by a different
means.
124. P. 189.
125. McCay makes this point a little more directly in a prior article:
We should at least try to be more specific when talking about environmental problems.
Are they tragedies of the commons, or of ineffective or incomplete communal
management? Or tragedies of open-access and laissez-faire management? Are they
tragedies of goverment mismanagement. . . and inadequate science ... ? Or tragedies
of the noncommons-of privatization?
Bonnie J. McCay, Common and Private Concerns, 4 ADVANCES IN HUM. ECOLOGY 89, 111 (1995).
126. P. 198.
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the decline was inevitable. In fact, policymakers would be misled if they
did not understand that the success or failure of a particular management
regime matters precisely because of the underlying theoretical truth that
uncontrolled, open access will lead to overexploitation of a resource.
Hardin's theory easily escapes McCay's first criticism unscathed.
B. McCay's Criticism of the Tragedy of the Commons as Misleading
Narrative
McCay's second criticism of Hardin's tragedy of the commons thesis
as "misleading" takes a different tack. Picking up on Carol Rose's work,
McCay argues that the tragedy of the commons "is less a formal model
than a powerful story," a "vivid narrative" designed to persuade others
about the nature of property relations. 7 Building on this notion, McCay
drops her inadequate critique of Hardin's model as misleading in favor of
an argument that the tragedy of the commons narrative is misleading.
McCay argues that the tragedy of the commons narrative is misleading
because it "tends to ignore and in practice often thereby weakens
communal systems of using and managing common resources."'" The
narrative, she asserts, creates "astounding" "blinders" 29 that "can draw
attention from potentials [sic] for effective management of the commons by
the commoners." 3 ' McCay's concern, however, is not just that the
tragedy of the commons narrative points away from communal
management, but also that the narrative "supports policies that privatize
some or all aspects of the use of natural resources."131 She suggests that
"[t]he open-access explanation of problems of the commons,"' leads
inexorably to familiar privatization solutions like "proposed sales of public
lands, the creation of tradable permits for emission of pollutants, and
carving up fisheries and forestry quotas into individual, transferable
units."' 33 This conclusion is at odds with Hardin, who specifically
127. P. xxiii. Carol Rose has long talked about property law as a form of storytelling. See
generally ROSE, supra note 88; Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game
Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37 (1990); Carol M. Rose, The
Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. Cal. L. REV. 711
(1986) [hereinafter Rose, The Comedy of the Commons].
128. P. xxiv. McCay has made this point in her other writing. See McCay, supra note 125, at
90 (arguing that tragedy of the commons models have "undermined or destroyed the option of
communal management of common property and generated tragedies of both the commons and the
commoners").
129. P. 189.
130. P. 197.
131. P. x; see also pp. xxvi-vii. In another article, McCay argued that the tragedy of the com-
mons idea tends to emphasize either a privatization solution or strong, centralized government control
of the resource. See McCay, supra note 125, at 90.
132. P. x.
133. P. x.
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suggested government regulation as a potential remedy to the tragedy of the
commons."3 Moreover, McCay never offers a clear explanation for why
or how the tragedy of the commons narrative necessarily leads to such pri-
vatization solutions.
McCay's proposed alternatives do, however, provide some insight into
her thinking. She suggests that a more appropriate narrative than the
tragedy of the commons would be a "tragedy of the commoners" 31 or
a "tragedy of a mismanaged commons."136 Although the reader is gener-
ally left to guess why these alternative narratives would be less likely to
lead to a privatization solution, McCay seems to be driving at the same
point Carol Rose made when she sought to change the narrative from the
tragedy of the commons to the comedy of the commons.' 7 McCay
appears concerned that, by thinking in terms of the commons as a tragic
situation, we are more inclined to adopt the most anticommons solution,
namely privatization. If this is McCay's reasoning, it is not without merit,
although it is still a long way from showing that Hardin's underlying
theory is "misleading." 38
Undoubtedly, the language we use to describe natural resource dilem-
mas has the potential to influence the solutions we propose. But McCay
goes too far if she means to suggest that policymakers have adopted privat-
ization solutions simply because they are held in the grip of the
mesmerizing metaphor of the tragedy of the commons. Ultimately, it is
134. See Hardin, supra note 15, at 1245. For a thought-provoking essay on the different manage-
ment strategies for common resources, see Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls:
Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DuKE L.J. 1 (identifying four management para-
digms that she calls "Do-Nothing," "Keepout," "Rightway," and "Property").
135. P. 195.
136. P. 189.
137. Rose contended that the commons need not be perceived as tragic in all contexts but could
profitably be viewed as
comedic, in the classical sense of a story with a happy outcome. And customary doctrines
suggest that commerce might be thought a "comedy of the commons" not only because
it may infinitely expand our wealth, but also, at least in part, because it has been thought
to enhance the sociability of the members of an otherwise atomized society.
Rose, The Comedy ofthe Commons, supra note 127, at 723. Rose's praise of the commons as some-
times comedic lends support to the view of so-called neocommunitarians who have argued in favor of
common property regimes. See infra notes 14142 and accompanying text (discussing the neo-
communitarian position). As discussed below, McCay considers herself a member of that group. P.
xxiv.
138. Harking back to her first criticism of the tragedy of the commons thesis as misleading,
McCay appears to assert that her alternative narratives would not only lead away from privatization but
would also be more accurate descriptions of New Jersey's oyster fishery. The "tragedy of a
mismanaged commons" would better describe the history of New Jersey's oyster fishery that suffered
a decline not simply because of overharvest but because of failures in local and state management of
the resource. And the "tragedy of the commoners" would better reflect that, when the oyster commons
was overexploited, those who suffered most were not the planters but the common oystermen who
relied on the natural beds.
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theory and not slogan that is the primary driver of natural resource policy.
And without attempting a thorough explanation in this review, it is cer-
tainly true that a variety of legitimate policy concerns underlie the various
privatization strategies for managing the commons. 139
Again, McCay's concern is not just that the tragedy of the commons
narrative points toward privatization, but that it points away from commu-
nal ownership solutions to resource decline."0 Her concerns echo those
of other "neocommunitarians, 14 1  whose views are encapsulated by
Alison Rieser:
Their reading of the Hardin metaphor is that the true commons were
not tragic at all. The tragedy only came about when forces of the
market economy destroyed the communal property regime and its
system of self-governance. These commentators argue for a "return"
to communal ownership rather than the more radical development of
private individual ownership .... 42
To the extent McCay advances this neocommunitarian critique-that
the market, not open-access to the commons, causes overexploitation-she
directly challenges Hardin's theory. Yet, to her credit, McCay is not will-
ing to go that far. She recognizes that whole-hearted acceptance of this
neocommunitarian critique would amount to "romancing the commons"
because the "long history of open-access fishing" in New Jersey and else-
where shows that communal property regimes and local systems of self-
governance were not able to halt the decline of the fishery."'3 McCay's
critique of Hardin's thesis as misleading is certainly weakened by this
admission.'" But even if McCay were correct that open access did not
139. For examples of arguments pointing out the benefits of privatizing common resources, see
ELMER A. KEEN, OWNERSHIP AND PRODUCTIVITY OF MARINE FISHERY RESOURCES 1 (1988); Richard
J. Agnello & Lawrence P. Donnelley, Property Rights and Efficiency in the Oyster Industry, 18 J.L.
& ECON. 521 (1975); James L. Huffman, The Inevitability of Private Rights in Public Lands, 65 U.
COLO. L. REv. 241 (1994); and Elzbieta M. Zechenter, The Socio-economic Transformation of Poland:
Privatization and the Future of Environmental Protection, 6 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 99 (1993).
140. McCay points to several communal arrangements that occurred in New Jersey as potential
approaches to management of common pool resources. Pp. 197-98. One such arrangement was the
state laws that gave local towns and committees control of their oyster fishery. See supra notes 94-95
(citing McCay's discussion of such laws in New Jersey and statutes from other states).
141. P. xxiv (describing herself as being among a group of "neocommunitarian" scholars).
142. Alison Rieser, Property Rights and Ecosystem Management in U.S. Fisheries: Contracting
for the Commons?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 813, 816 (1997); see also Susan J.B. Cox, No Tragedy on the
Commons, 7 ENVTL. ETHICS 49, 50 (1985) (arguing that the decline of the commons in medieval and
post-medieval England was caused not by unlimited access, but rather by the Industrial Revolution,
agrarian reform, and improvements in agricultural practices). Carol Rose's view of the commons as
comedic also partakes of this neocommunitarian viewpoint. See supra note 137 (discussing Rose's
thesis).
143. P. xxiv.
144. If it is true that McCay's admission of the danger of romancing the commons weakens her
critique, it is also true that the admission strengthens the integrity of her project. If McCay's objective
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result in overexploitation because of communal arrangements, it does not
deny the validity of Hardin's theory. Such communal arrangements only
show that communities themselves recognized the truth undergirding the
tragedy of the commons narrative and took steps to order and limit exploi-
tation of the commons.145
IV. Conclusion
To the reader of more traditional law review literature, Oyster Wars
may prove a bit frustrating. McCay's anthropological approach eschews
a linear argument that drives toward a well-defined normative position on
the public trust doctrine or the tragedy of the commons in favor of a
pastiche of events, anecdotes, and insights on both issues. Yet it is
precisely McCay's contextual approach that gives Oyster Wars its value.
By thoroughly exploring the laws, customs, and events of New Jersey's
oyster industry, Oyster Wars, though perhaps not intentionally, illuminates
the dubious origins of the public trust doctrine. And even though McCay
does not succeed in showing the tragedy of the commons to be misleading,
her exploration of the oyster industry illuminates a range of possible
reasons for resource decline and a range of possible management solutions
for policymakers to consider as they struggle to address the tragedy of the
commons.
is to "raise questions about things we take for granted," p. 198, and to encourage policymakers to con-
sider a range of possible reasons for resource decline and a range of possible management solutions,
such admissions are much more likely to be persuasive than bold criticisms of the tragedy of the com-
mons as misleading.
145. A neocommunitarian might argue that certain communal arrangements do indeed counter
Hardin's thesis by avoiding overexploitation of the commons without the need for coercion. Coercion
(whether by government enforcement of private property rights or of management regulations) was,
of course, an essential component of Hardin's remedy to the tragedy of the commons. See Hardin,
supra note 15, at 1245, 1247-48. It seems, however, implausible that coercion historically played no
role in maintaining so-called communal relationships. To the extent coercion did not exist, the most
likely explanation is an absence of pressure on the resource.
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